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 Technology and the Tributaries of Relational Being 
 Kenneth J.  Gergen 
 My concern with historical transformations in the conception of self has 
its own history. Its earliest traces can be found in my 1973 essay, “ Social 
psychology as history ,” where I proposed that as  scientii c accounts of 
the person enter society, so can they alter the commonly shared  visions 
of self. Authoritative accounts of brain determination of human action, 
for example, can shit  the way in which we understand ourselves and our 
behavior. h e sense of self, in this case, becomes no more than an artifact 
of brain stimulation. And with shit s in understanding, so are the cultural 
mores set in motion and institutional policies transformed. Such concerns 
gained momentum in the later development of social constructionist the-
ory (Gergen,  1994 ), and its focus on the historical and cultural lodgement 
of self- understanding (see, e.g., Graumann & Gergen,  1996 ). Most central 
to the present essay, however, was my 1992 book,  h e Saturated Self . h is 
work was centrally concerned with the twentieth century emergence of 
communication technology and its potentials for transforming the com-
mon conception of self . 
 My particular focus in this work was on the  Western tradition of indi-
vidualism in which the origins of action are traced to psychological pro-
cesses within the person. For much of Western culture, the concept of the 
individual self – the conscious and cognizant agent of action – is more 
or less accepted as a natural fact. In courts of law we hold individuals 
responsible for their actions; in educational settings, we hold individuals 
responsible for their work; in therapy we treat individual suf ering; and in 
our democracy each individual is endowed with the right to a vote. Yet, 
this concept of the individual agent is also peculiarly Western and largely 
a by- product of cultural developments emerging in the seventeenth and 
culminating in the twentieth century (see, e.g., Seigel,  2005 ; Taylor,  1992 ). 
It is a view to which philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, and Kant 
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made major contributions, but that was also nurtured by the develop-
ment of a merchant class, the Reformation, the ultimate development of 
democracy, and the conception of empirical science. Sampson ( 2008 ) and 
others have coined the term “self- contained” in referring to this concep-
tion of the  self; elsewhere (Gergen,  2009 ) I have used the metaphor of 
“bounded being .” h e main argument is that with the emergence of a new 
range of communication technologies, this traditional vision of the self is 
fading from the cultural landscape. 
 h ese developments i rst undermine the social supports necessary to sus-
tain a stable and compelling view of the self. Traditional communities could 
be characterized in terms of their high degree of stability, reiterative com-
munication patterns, shared beliefs and values, mutual support, and shared 
knowledge about the participants. With the advent of the radio, the auto-
mobile, rapid transit, mass publishing, television, jet transportation, and the 
Internet in particular, the traditional community has been placed in jeopardy. 
All of these technologies functioned to remove individuals from their loca-
tion within the community. Such removals are both physical (through mass 
transportation, jet transportation, etc.) and psychological (through radio, 
television, the Internet, etc.). As workers of the nation become increasingly 
mobile, executives become increasingly global, and the activities of moth-
ers and children are more widely dispersed (supermarkets, district schools, 
at er- school activities), the population of active and available neighbors is 
substantially reduced . 
 Community dissolution is matched as well by the demise of its heart, 
namely the nuclear family. In many homes in the United States there are 
multiple televisions in the house – so that each family member can dwell 
in a separate symbolic ethos. h ere are alluring possibilities for the young 
to live private lives in their tech- furnished bedrooms – CD players, com-
puter games, cell phone, amplii ed guitar, and so forth. h ere is ot en a 
family computer as well, with high competition among family members 
for Internet access. Many households harbor multiple laptops, so that even 
when they share the same dwelling, each family member can live in a sepa-
rate social world, each with its own constructions of the real and the good . 
 Yet, we may ask, if we are witnessing the slow  demise of the individual-
ist tradition, how are we to understand its replacement? What new trajec-
tory can we discern in the contemporary landscape of cultural life? h is 
is scarcely a simple question and continued rel ection is essential. In what 
follows I make a case for a shit  from an individualist to a relational con-
ception of self . However, as I propose, this shit  is not unii ed. Rather, the 
general l ow is constituted by a range of qualitatively dif erent tributaries, 
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each related to particular developments in technology. In the present of er-
ing I sketch out three movements toward relational being: the unbounded 
self, the encapsulated self, and the playing self. My attempt here is not to  be 
dei nitive but to glimpse movements in action, so as to better contemplate 
our possible futures. With these trajectories in place, it will be useful to con-
sider the emerging conditions of cultural life that may be favored. 
 The  Unbounded Self 
 While the emerging technologies of communication undermine the com-
mon conception of individual, autonomous agents, they also turn attention 
toward relationships. By the mid- twentieth century, automobiles, radio, 
i lm, television, mass transportation, and intercontinental air travel had all 
opened massive new vistas of connection. “Over there” was now “in the living 
room.” With the  development of the Internet there was a radical expansion 
in the availability of low- cost means of learning about and/or communi-
cating with people from around the globe. Electronic mail, websites, blogs, 
games, music, art, live conversations, and other resources travel around the 
world on an instantaneous basis. h ere are now well over a billion users of 
the Internet world wide, most of them relying on e- mail communication. 
In the United States, more than 70 percent of the population now relies on 
Internet services, and by the time it takes to read this paragraph, more than 
5 million e- mail messages will have moved through cyberspace. It is esti-
mated that today there are more than 500 million websites, with the amount 
of information accumulating each year equaling 30 feet of books per person 
for the entirety of the world’s population. h e average Internet user in the 
United States now spends approximately 100 hours a month online. More 
recently, however, these developments have been augmented by the massive 
explosion of social media. On Facebook alone there are almost 650 million 
visitors during any given month, twice the size of the U.S. population . 
 In all of these contexts new relations are formed and af ective bonds 
ot en created outside one’s immediate social surrounds. Increasing num-
bers of people come to “matter,” even if this mattering is ot en l eeting and 
superi cial. Each relationship may also invite subtle (and sometimes not so 
subtle) shit s in one’s manner of being. In this sense, identity becomes l uid, 
shit ing in a chameleon- like way from one social context to another. h ere 
is no coherent community to recognize and support an obdurate sense of 
identity. Rather, one’s sense of self becomes subject to a multitude of tan-
gentially related others, each of whom may bring forth and ai  rm a dif er-
ent “me.” h e boundary of what  is and what  is not self begins to erode. 
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 h ere is also little reason in this context for “looking inward” to  locate 
“one’s true self.” h is once- signii cant question ceases to be relevant to 
ongoing participation in social life. h e fascination with “inward depth” 
is replaced by curiosity in the next arrival of an e- mail message, cell 
phone text, or tweet. Indeed, for the newer generations the very idea of a 
core- self turns strange. Nor are there close companions available for reli-
able, in- depth explorations of the “inner region of the self.” Increasingly 
we are strung out across the continents, electronically and geographically 
mobile, and increasingly overcommitted to numerous relations, projects, 
and desires. As the sense of self as bounded, privatized, and centered is 
undone, so does the relational matrix become central to daily existence. h e 
Enlightenment paean to individualism, “I think, therefore I am” is replaced 
with “I am linked, therefore I am.” h is is not to say that the sense of self is 
fully absorbed into the relational l ow. Rather, one may envision here the 
development of a range of partial or fragmented selves. For example, as 
one moves from one website to another, one is immersed in a range of con-
trasting realities. From the Al Jazeera website one may absorb certain Arab 
logics and values; from the Conservative Outpost, a dash of right-wing 
Republicanism; from the ACLU, the latest on the protection of free speech; 
from YouTube, zaniness from around the world, and so on. Nor is it simply 
a sense of learning in multiple worlds. In addition, one comes to appreciate 
many ideal ways of being. One may variously identify with a range of oth-
ers who seem git ed or honorable in one form or another – in politics, pop 
culture, sports, religion, scholarship, and more. One’s range of aspirations 
expands. With this continuous expansion in the dimensions of relational 
engagement, the sense of a bounded and coherent self slowly gives way to 
a “multiphrenia” of partial and conl icted senses of self. I become a multi-
 being (Gergen,  2009 ) who brings to any situation an enormous range of 
potentials. 
 With these accretions in potentials for saying and doing,  there is also an 
increase in one’s capacity for sensitive coordination in other relationships 
and similarly with millions of others around the world. h e potential for 
ef ective coordination expands exponentially. h e result is not only a pro-
found increase in ongoing connectivity, but the world’s peoples also become 
increasingly capable of ef ective collaboration. And with increased capabili-
ties, so does global organizing become increasingly ef ective. h e small busi-
ness can expand, a medium- sized business can develop markets abroad, and a 
large business can go global. Increased organization takes place at all levels – 
the community, the state, the regional, the national, and the international. 
h ere is a globally expanding network of police that parallels the expansion 
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of globally organized crime and terrorism. To appreciate the rate of growth 
in international organizing, consider that in 1950 there were estimated to be 
approximately a thousand non- governmental organizations in the United 
States with active, intercontinental programs. h ere are currently more than 
60,000 such organizations. It should come as little surprise that there are 
more than 12 million websites now treating the importance of collaboration 
in the workplace. In ef ect, the unbounded self thus lends skills to forms of 
organizing that further expand the movement toward relational being . 
 Yet, we must not conclude that the future of unbounded being is alto-
gether rosy. In the “un- bounding” there is let  behind in most cultures of 
the world at least one of two possible traditions. For those who reside in 
highly individualistic societies, as in the West, the tradition of the unii ed 
and self- contained agent will continue at the edge of consciousness, whis-
pering admonitions about one’s shallowness, spinelessness, and inauthen-
ticity. At more painful moments, the unbounded self may be torn between 
allegiances, unable to make a decision. Rather than confronting oppressive 
forces, there may be few resources to muster in the service of resistance. 
And there will be desolate times when the unbounded self may feel without 
deep and reliable connection to anyone. 
 For those who issue from more collectivist cultures (ot en associated 
with the non- Western world), there is the continuing voice of one’s ori-
gin group at one’s side – whether familial, communal, ethnic, or religious. 
h is can variously be a voice of disappointment, distrust, love, irritation, 
and rejection, as those who have been “let  behind” do not so easily part 
with their members. And, as those who live an unbounded life may become 
aware, once immersed in the global l ows of relationship, one can seldom 
return to the communal home with full and satisfying presence . 
 The  Encapsulated Self 
 A major result of communication technology has been a radical expansion 
in the extensity and intensity of relational life. As proposed, one signii -
cant result of this shit  is the subtle replacement of the individualist vision 
of longstanding with a consciousness of relational embeddedness. Yet, as 
I have characterized this conception thus far, it is one of unbounded rela-
tions. One moves from a centered sense of self to a vision of an ini nite and 
continuously moving engagement in relating. h is view fails to take into 
account another signii cant feature of the same communication technolo-
gies, namely their potentials for arresting the l ow of relationships. By this 
I mean that the available communication technologies also enable  people 
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to remain insulated within cocoons of meaning. h ese technologies permit 
people to locate others who hold similar values and visions of the future. 
Such connections may be maintained on a continuous basis, with virtually 
instantaneous access.  Support for one’s views and values is available at every 
turn, giving comfort to one’s perspective and/or way of life, and thus invit-
ing one to “remain secure in the fold.” As an example, anyone interested in 
the neo- Nazi movement, Aryanism, or white supremacy can now locate 
more than a dozen websites that will enable connections to form across 
the Western world. h ese sites of er various conversation groups, periodic 
meetings, written materials, and even a dating and mating service. One may 
remain easily encapsulated within the community. 
 Yet, although the number of Web- based communities is enormous , it 
is  the mobile phone that demands more specii c attention. As I have else-
where proposed (Gergen,  2002 ) the mobile phone is of unusual importance 
because it is almost unique as a technology of communal restoration. It 
of ers the possibility for continuous and instantaneous reconnection of par-
ticipants within face- to- face groups. Within moments, relationships are re- 
enlivened, common opinions and values shared, expressions of support and 
mutual understanding enhanced, and knowledge of the other deepened. 
In a Bakhtinian sense, while most of the broadly shared technologies are 
centrifugal in their ef ects, disrupting and dispersing conventional systems 
of meaning, the mobile phone tends to function centripetally. It reinforces 
the commonalties and secures them more steadfastly. It signii es the impor-
tance of connection as opposed to autonomy, looking outward rather than 
inward, toward network as opposed to self- sui  ciency. 
 Yet, this restoration of community deserves closer examination. For we 
are not witnessing here a re- l owering of the traditional face- to- face com-
munity. Rather, to borrow a descriptive phrase from nineteenth century 
Japan, we are witnessing the emergence of “l oating worlds.” As in the 
Japanese case, it is a world of social interchange that escapes the control 
of government and military/police authority. People are free to speak of all 
matters great and small, regardless of whether they are lovers exchanging 
sighs of longing, family members arranging a rendezvous, or drug deal-
ers negotiating sales. It also resembles the l oating world of Edo, Japan, in 
its functioning around an axis of petty pleasure. In large degree, mobile 
communication is informal, unscripted, and used in ways that enhance the 
pleasures of relationship (e.g., romance, friendship, family life, colleague-
ship.) Lovers or spouses may call each other several times a day, using jus-
tii cations that seem only to mask the enjoyment that is their aim.  As Puro 
( 2002 ) has described Finnish mobile phone users, they seem to “create an 
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obligation for talk without a reason for a talk” (p. 27). Finally, as in the 
Japanese case, there is no stable center of communal life. h ere is no specii c 
geographical location or membership group to which the concept of com-
munity can be attached. h e community is always there in a potential state, 
brought into being only in those moments when two or more participants 
are in communication. 
 Yet, unlike the Japanese case, the l oating world of mobile phone users is 
not geographically grounded. h e l oating world of the mobile phone user 
is approaching the point of geographic irrelevance. Its participants may vir-
tually be anywhere at any time. Like the hovercrat  or the pneumatic rail 
system, they are elevated from the physical terrain; there is no specii c loca-
tion with which they can be identii ed. More broadly, it may be said that 
the mobile phone lends itself to the pervasive state of an  absent presence , 
the continuous presence at hand of friends, family, and colleagues who are 
physically absent. 
 In ef ect, there are dwelling about us at all times numerous small commu-
nities that are unseen and unidentii able. As we stroll the thoroughfare or sip 
cof ee in a cafe their presence may be made known to us. Each mobile phone 
conversation is a sign of a signii cant social nucleus, stretching in all direc-
tions, amorphous and protean. We cannot reach out to touch the nucleus, 
behold it directly, or interrogate it. Yet, it may lie somewhere toward the cen-
ter of importance – guiding virtually all the actions of those who are near. 
 I point to the importance of these interchanges because they ot en issue 
from tightly knit micro- communities. h e ways in which mobile phone 
communication enhances and sustains group connection has been the sub-
ject of broad commentary. For example, Ling and Yttri ( 2002 ) describe the 
way in which the cell phone enhances “micro- coordination,” the capacity 
of people within the circle to adjust their actions to each other and move 
together harmoniously as a unit. h ere is also the use of the phone in what 
they term “hyper- coordination,” or the integration of the group in terms of 
emotional expressions and self- dei nitions. As Gournay ( 2002 ) describes it, 
the mobile phone moves us toward “fusional” relationships, in which “the 
inner circle” is vitally strengthened. As Fortunati (2002) puts it, the mobile 
phone is “a strong booster of intimacy among those within the social net-
work of the user” (p. 51). With continuous communication, those within the 
circle can develop a high degree of mutual trust and support. 
 It is also important to note that the new l oating worlds are  nicely 
adapted to the demands of life in a highly complex, rapidly moving, high-
 tech society. h is is so i rst because participants can rapidly obtain infor-
mation from those within the circle as the demands of the day (or night) 
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unfold. One can obtain directions, advice, support, and the coni dence of 
shared opinions and values. Or, if one suddenly learns or recalls informa-
tion useful to another within the circle, this can be transmitted at once. 
h is close interdependency also lends itself to micro- social fragmentation. 
As the small group consumes an increasing proportion of communication 
time, issues not inherent to group interests lose salience. As small group 
concerns are intensii ed, so are demographic divisions pressed to the mar-
gins of consciousness. h e problems, challenges, and possibilities of the 
micro- structure diminish concerns with broad societal schisms. Micro-
 social concerns and conl icts become focal. In Gournay’s ( 2002 ) terms, “We 
are seeing a desire for closure of the relational network, reduced to a few 
close friends and the family core ” (p. 202). 
 Similar to the case of unbounded being, we i nd here an incipient dimin-
ishing of the autonomous, agentive self so central to the Western tradition. 
Replacing this traditional sense of self is an abiding consciousness of con-
nection. Again, this newly emerging subjectivity is not without its prob-
lems. As  Turkle ( 2011 ) suggests, participation in these social enclosures can 
generate a need for continuous validation. “Am I ok? Am I making the right 
choice here? What will they think?” One becomes helplessly dependent on 
social ai  rmation. Further, as Turkle proposes, there may be little nourish-
ment here for what she feels are deeper needs for intimacy. Ultimately, she 
proposes, participants in the 24/7 world of connection may begin to look to 
technology itself as a replacement for human relationships . 
 Of course, it is dii  cult to fathom the trajectories that may emerge as 
technologies of communication develop. However, that the need for valida-
tion threatens one with a sense of helplessness is a problem only if “helpless-
ness” itself is devalued. With continued immersion in one’s bounded circles, 
the desired state may ultimately become that of “rocking in the cradle” of 
continuous ai  rmation. And what may seem to be “deeper needs for inti-
macy” may simply be a historically situated construction, slowly decaying 
in the new age of technology . 
 The  Playing Self 
 In the preceding accounts of the shit ing sands of self- dei nition –  toward 
unbounded and encapsulated relationality – we focused on process with-
out content. h at is, we centered attention on the generalized movement 
away from the traditional individualist vision of the self and the emerging 
importance of relational being. However, there is a third direction favored 
by the emerging technologies that specii cally centers on the content of 
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communication, and most specii cally on play. I expand on my concerns 
in this case, as discussions on the unbounded and encapsulated self may be 
found in previous writings. 
 My interest in the cultural shit  toward play was sparked several years 
ago when my morning newspaper greeted me with a front- page, banner-
 size headline and photo touting the dramatic win of the city’s professional 
football team. h e account of the game bristled with excitement. In smaller 
print at the top of the page was a report on the winning ways of a local 
basketball team. It was only in the nether regions of the page that I discov-
ered reports on national and international af airs, all properly phrased in 
the monochromatic hues of impartial objectivity. Struck by the attention 
given to matters of sport, I became curious about the general content of the 
newspaper. Interestingly, the sports section proved to be substantially larger 
than the i rst and principle news section. h e entertainment section also 
exceeded the size of the i nancial section. If I subtracted the advertisements 
from the pages, the portion of the paper devoted to playful matters was 
more than twice that of what one might call serious news. A few months 
later, an editorial in the paper opined that the name of this winning football 
team “is not only a piece of the town’s history; it also conjures its essence.” 
 h is composition of the news may be commonplace in today’s world. 
But it was not so in the world of my youth, nor it seems in previous history. 
My curiosity increased. Is a shit  in cultural investments now in motion, 
and if so, is it an important one? Has play truly become the dominant cul-
tural activity? A scanning of  statistics on professional sports in the United 
States was provocative: In professional baseball for a recent season, the 
gross revenues reached a record- breaking $7 billion. As the Major League 
Baseball Commissioner, Bud Selig, announced, “h is is the golden era for 
the sport, and given the (weak) economy this may be the most remarkable 
year we ever had. We’re at numbers nobody ever thought possible.” Paid 
attendance at the games was more than 73 million. For professional football, 
the revenue that year was almost $8 billion, with 26 million paid fans and 
a television audience of at least 500 times this number. h en there are the 
basketball and hockey seasons to consider, among others. Considering the 
professional sports industry in the United States altogether, the gross reve-
nues in 2010 reached $414 billion. h is i gure exceeded the total revenues  of 
the combined governments of Costa Rica, India, Lithuania, Bolivia, Chile, 
Finland, Morocco, Romania, and Pakistan during the same period. And all 
this was to say nothing of the lively interest in golf, tennis, auto racing, and 
soccer, along with, skiing, casino gambling, horse racing, gymnastics, skate-
boarding, online gambling, televised poker, and fantasy sports . 
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 However, the most  dramatic developments are surely in the virtual world. 
A homely example is revealing, important as well in suggesting that the shit  
toward play is not solely an American phenomenon: When visiting friends 
in the Netherlands, I was told that they were to entertain their grandchildren 
for the at ernoon. Later, the two boys, three and i ve, burst into the house, and 
without more than a nodding acknowledgment of the assembled gathering, 
raced up the stairs. h eir destination: the two computers in the upstairs oi  ce. 
Within minutes they were both absorbed in online games. h ey were allowed 
to remain so for an hour, at which point cruel grandmother pulled the switch. 
It was human time again. Such an event will scarcely be surprising to any 
young parents. At the present time, there are now more than 200 million web-
sites related to computer games. One of these sites, chosen at random, of ers 
1,500 games, and has more than 70,000 participants. Another of ers games in 
more than 40 languages. Players on the MMOs (massively multiplayer games), 
such as those featured on Facebook and other social network sites, cater to 
more than 100 million participants a year. h e participants spend more than 
$1  billion annually. Video games, such as those sold for Xbox, garner far 
greater income. Revenues of video games now exceed $20 billion internation-
ally. More than 20 million players have spent 17 billion hours on Xbox Live, 
which is more than 2 hours for every person on the planet. Another 40 million 
users have registered PlayStation Network accounts. 
 Among the major characteristics of games, as dei ned by scholars such 
as Huizinga (1938) and Caillois ( 2001 ), are that they are non–income-
 producing activities, non- obligatory, and circumscribed in space and time. 
Further, as they see it, there are rules of participation (either explicit or 
implicit). Participation, in turn, evokes an alternative reality, a reality that 
has the capacity to enchant or captivate. Dei ned in this way, it is legiti-
mate to include within the cultural shit  toward play, the shared indul-
gences in TV drama, movies, YouTube, online porn, pop music, romance 
novels, and social networks. As Timmermans (2010) and Pearson ( 2009 ) 
both describe, online activities such as these are essentially playful. We 
may, then, distinguish among three forms of play. First there is  Social Play , 
constituted by the vast majority of communication taking place in social 
 networks. Communication in this context not only creates a playful ambi-
ence, but is also a site on which people communicate about both specta-
tor and participatory play, thus enhancing their signii cance. Second, there 
is  Spectator Play , constituted by the vast range of spectator pleasures, as 
facilitated by television, movies, magazines, newspapers, and radio. Finally 
there is  Competitive Play , made up of the enormous range of participatory 
competitive games, both electronic and organic . 
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 Let us characterize the general shit  in cultural investments of attention, 
time, and money in these three spheres in terms of  Playland , denoting a 
world in which the dominant cultural activities – along with the mean-
ing these activities give to life – center on participation in various forms of 
play. If this lens for viewing cultural life carries legitimacy, numerous ques-
tions follow, concerning, for example, the reasons for this historical shit ; its 
ef ects on families, communities, and nation; its implications for education 
and governance; and so on. However, my chief concern here is the implica-
tions of life in playland for the ways in which we come to understand our-
selves, and the meaning of our lives. 
 At the outset, one might well be inclined to see in this movement an 
extension and intensii cation of the agentive “I.” One might surmise that 
most games celebrate the individual strategist, who aspires to success; who 
vanquishes; and who trains, plans, schemes, and carries out tactics for 
purposes of winning. In the process of playing, personal agency is reii ed; 
individualism is refurbished. Certain gaming structures certainly lend 
themselves to such a result, but in general, I am not persuaded. Consider 
again the three forms of cultural play: social play, spectator play, and com-
petitive games. It is in the context of social play that my case for the erosion 
of the bounded self and the coming of relational being was signii cantly 
based. E- mail, Facebook, cell phones, Twitter, and the like all immerse us 
in the co- constituting process of communication. In each case, our actions 
are inherently “for the other,” and without the other they lose meaning alto-
gether. To abandon all of one’s interlocutors would eviscerate one’s sense 
of self. On the level of spectator pleasure, there is also a diminishment of 
the agentive “I,” but the route is dif erent. In this case the dominant plea-
sure is taken from the process of identii cation, particularly the spectator’s 
fantasized narrative of self as the player. Because the drama of games is one 
typically featuring success versus failure or good versus evil, the potential 
for games to generate heroic i gures is great. Movie and television dramas 
yield a similar panoply of “gods” and “goddesses.” As a spectator, the iden-
tii cation process may remain wholly in fantasy. However, the fantasies also 
carry over into purchasing apparel fetishizing the hero, or adopting  the 
hero’s mannerisms, gestures, or ways of life. h e important point is that 
when immersed in spectator pleasures, one brackets the sense of authentic 
being. One lives temporarily as the other . 
 In both of these conditions we i nd an alteration in consciousness, from 
the traditional sense of “I am the master of my actions” to an “out- of- self ” 
condition; in the former case, “I am an actor for others” and in the latter, “I 
experience as the other.” Let us view these as subtle movements in terms of 
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the emergence of a  second- order self , a sense of self as other than self, or a 
state of para- being. On the more extreme level, the sense of a second- order 
self may characterize one’s condition under the inl uence of a drug, or when 
sexually aroused, romantically infatuated, or fully immersed in a stage role. 
One is fully compelled by activities that might be described as ego- alien. 
h ese activities spin out spontaneously, without deliberate thought, and 
ot en surprisingly. Now consider the case of competitive games: I watch 
as my twelve- year- old grandson sits in a special chair designed for online 
gamers. h e chair approximates the seat of a jet i ghter pilot or a motorcycle 
driver. His eyes are fastened on the television screen, his hands grip preci-
sion controls for the events unfolding before him, and the booming sounds 
of these clamorous events bellow from nearby speakers embedded in the 
chair. h is is not “John, my studious grandson, with polite manners, tidied 
room, and careful eating habits.” h at John is absent, now replaced by a 
rampant killer, emptying bullets into dark i gures lurking in shadows or 
leaping from doorways, casting grenades across barriers to see bodies torn 
to bits, moving ever forward to slay as many combatants as possible. h is 
is the intoxication of a second- order self. All the frustrations, ambiguities, 
complexities – along with the possible emptiness – of daily life are removed. 
One lives a thrilling life as a hero with a thousand lives, but returns to the 
dinner table as dutiful son. 
 To be sure, this is a dramatized account, and it is clearly more relevant to 
some forms of participatory games than others. But virtually all competi-
tive games invite one – for however long an amount of time – to become a 
second- order self. h e increased presence of second- order being might not 
be so important in itself. To play tennis or golf once or twice a week proba-
bly has little impact on the remainder of one’s life. One plays, and when play 
is terminated, one returns to everyday demands. However, a closer exami-
nation is required. h ere is now substantial literature in the human sci-
ences – from the late nineteenth century to the present – proposing that one 
of the major inl uences on human development is imitative role- playing. In 
their play, children imitate their parents, for example, and in playing out 
these  roles their personalities and potentials are shaped. In the same way, in 
entering a profession one imitates the behavior of other professionals and 
attempts to play the role of the professional . 
 Of special importance to the present chapter, it is out of these processes 
that one’s sense of self emerges. In being other, one becomes oneself. Play 
gives way to a sense of obdurate identity. Consider again the emergence 
of playland: Activities in social networks, as we have seen, invite playing 
with one’s identity; spectator activities invite imitation of players; and with 
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competitive games one indeed becomes the player. With sustained and 
intense participation in playland, the conditions are in place for the emer-
gence of a genuine  playing self . h e sense of a second- order self gives way to 
a i rst-order one: “I am a player.” 
 As the sense of the playing self gains strength, so do states of authentic 
being become suspect. To create a series of avatars or game identities poses 
little problem; with chameleon- like ease, one i ts congenially into the game 
at hand. Within the individualist tradition, with its emphasis on authen-
ticity, one might  choose to play, depending on the outcome; however, as a 
playing self, one is simply playing without asking questions of outcome. In 
the same way, one does not choose to breathe the air; breathing is just the 
nature of life. For the playing self, one who calculates daily decisions about 
work and play may seem naïve. To fancy oneself as a rational agent, care-
fully weighing the outcomes of a decision is foolish: “Don’t you know it’s all 
a game?”  Richard Rorty’s (1989) conception of the  liberal ironist is apt. For 
Rorty, propositions about the real and the good are without rational foun-
dations. Yet, those realizing that this is so may nevertheless commit them-
selves to relieving suf ering in the world. h ey commit to liberal causes, 
understanding full well that there are no knock- down arguments for doing 
so, no foundations for commitment . In the same way, in taking issues of life 
seriously, the playing self understands that they are not serious. Or as  Oscar 
Wilde  would put it, “Deep down he is superi cial.” 
 As the playing self emerges in cultural life, what are the implications for 
daily life? What is worth doing; on what kind of narrative journey is one 
embarked? To treat such issues we obviously broaden the realm of interpre-
tive complexity. As commentators we are immersed in the very processes 
about which we write; we grapple with understanding a condition that 
is not, for us, an object of observation. h e hope, however, is that in the 
grappling we generate resources for collectively navigating our way. With 
this said, it is my view that with the playing self, the strong individualist 
account of human functioning recedes. One does not ask, in the abstract, 
“what would I Iike to be?” and look inward for the resources to reach  this 
self- determined end. Rather, one recognizes that one is forever function-
ing within a relational context, with other players, with rules and expecta-
tions, and with of erings of what is possible and what is precluded. One may 
ask about preferred ends within a context, but there is no meta- contextual 
location from which to take a stand. h e playing self is relationally depen-
dent. h is does not mean confronting a prei xed world, where one can 
only play within the boundaries of tradition. On the contrary, because 
one understands that one comes into being through playing, and that the 
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games are created by players, then new games are always possible. All that 
is required is another player responding enthusiastically to the invitation, 
“let’s imagine that ….” 
 h e life course for the playing self is thus indeterminate. As Timmerman 
(2010) proposes, in the digitalized contexts of the game world the vision of 
a coherent life narrative is no longer compelling. h e latter vision is a by- 
product of a textual world. In ef ect, the playing self is ideally adapted to 
the technologically driven ethos in which change is continuous and rapid. 
Living disjunctively is not, then, unsettling. Rather, the ini nite possibility 
of new and exciting life- games is optimistic and energizing. 
 Does the playing self thus lack moral i ber; is this a spineless creature 
for whom anything goes? I do not think so. Rather, one’s existence as a 
playing self requires the presence of a game, and games require for their 
existence rules of conduct. h ese rules, in turn, contain values – what it is 
to win and lose, to succeed and fail, to play fairly or unfairly. As mentioned 
earlier, most video games are based on a narrative in which heroes are pit-
ted against villains. h us, a world of virtue is built into both the content and 
structure of the game. Extrapolating to life outside the game, the playing 
self would be prone to a  situated ethics . He or she would be sensitive to local 
moralities, but would be resistant to transcendent moral principles. h is 
does mean that because the rules of a game are ultimately arbitrary, and 
one ultimately plays to win, situated ethics may run thin. Whether on Wall 
Street, the battlei eld, or in the neighborhood, if winning is at stake, little 
else matters. Bending the rules may be a pervasive temptation, with little 
investment in grappling with issues of moral ambiguity or integrity . 
 The Future in View: Between Peril and Prosperity 
 In the preceding account my special concern has been with three con-
temporary forms of self transformation. All three of these have in com-
mon a strong link with, on the one hand, the profusion of communication 
 technologies, and on the other, a shit  away from the traditional Western 
vision of independent and agentive selves. Favored in all cases is a move-
ment toward a relational sense of self. However, depending on the form of 
technological immersion, three dif erent accents of the relational self can 
be detected. Roughly speaking, dependency on social media, including the 
World Wide Web and e- mail, favor a sense self cast on a sea of unbounded 
relationship. In contrast, a dependency on mobile communication, invites 
a more encapsulated sense of relationality. One’s identity is cemented to 
the small enclave of interlocutors. Finally, immersion in electronic games 
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and related media and networks favors a sense of a playing self. One loses 
identity in the ongoing process of “the game.” To be sure, these are analytic 
categories, scarcely representing the possible overlaps, synergies, and vast 
sectors of a non- participating public. h e attempt here has not been to be 
inclusive but to of er resources for rel exive dialogue. 
 It is also important to note that although communication technologies 
are surely an important factor in such transformations, their reverberations 
do not occur in a historical vacuum. h eir ramii cations are supplemented 
by several additional movements. h ere is, for one, the impact of global orga-
nizing. Although itself drawing from technological developments, move-
ments toward globally organizing business, science, sports, scholarship, 
religion, and so on place a strong demand on collaboration. Increasingly, 
participants in such movements i nd their future depending not on the tra-
ditional virtues of self- reliance, character, and autonomy, but on participat-
ing harmoniously and ef ectively in groups. In addition to globalization, the 
growing consciousness of environmental catastrophe also places a major 
stress on relationship. In the face of global warming, atomic power pro-
duction, species eradication, dwindling water resources, and the like, we 
confront a choice between productive collaboration and catastrophe. h e 
ef orts of isolated individuals are insui  cient. h ere are no land masses that 
are exempt from environmental threat. In ef ect, we realize that a viable 
future depends on the collaborative capacity of the world’s peoples. 
 Although the forces favoring a relational consciousness of self are 
prevalent, continuing discussion is also essential concerning the impli-
cations for cultural life. Many may lament the erosion in individualism, 
once regarded as the cornerstone of American democracy and productiv-
ity. Others will be concerned with the threats to traditions of individual 
responsibility and possible tyrannies of the collective. At the same time, a 
growing number of critics have explored the corrosive impact on individu-
als and society of what they view as the ideology of individualism (Bellah 
et al.,  1985 ; Lasch,  1979 ; Leary,  2004 ; Sampson,  2008 ). As many see it, when 
the  individual agent is held to be the fundamental atom of society, we set 
the stage for narcissism, seli shness, alienation, loneliness, self- doubt, and 
antagonism. Further, we develop institutions in which competition, judg-
mental evaluation, and hierarchy prevails. When we hold that it is funda-
mentally a world of “all against all,” we lean toward global distrust. In this 
context, movements toward relational conceptions of the self are much to 
be welcomed. h ey form a promising alternative to the individualist tradi-
tion, one that might form an invaluable resource as we move toward global 
interdependency. 
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 Yet, in my view, there are distinct dif erences among these three trajecto-
ries in terms of future promise. As we move into a world in which multiple 
perspectives, values, and ways of life are increasingly thrown into confronta-
tion, we enter a space that is both dangerous and pregnant with potential. On 
the one side, within any reality- making enclave we now have the technologi-
cal potential to i nd 24/7 support. If invested in a religious, ethnic, political, 
or business enterprise, for example, our chorus of ai  rmation is never fur-
ther than a click away. One’s vision of reality, or commitment to a way of life, 
need never be questioned. As a result, there may be crystallization and an 
accompanying resistance to any alternative reality or way of life. Such resis-
tance may also give way quite rapidly to animosity and its deadly sequelae. 
We recognize this condition in the dead- end political conl ict infecting our 
government, no less than in the religious strife now dominating the globe. 
When carried to an extreme we move toward a new level of “all against all,” 
one with devastating consequences. 
 At the same time, we also recognize that the chief origins of innovation 
lie within the hybridization of cultures or subcultures. To sustain a given 
tradition of reality- making is to circumscribe the possibilities for action. In 
bringing traditions together, not only are possibilities expanded, but new 
combinations also become apparent. In ef ect, invention is largely a byprod-
uct of relationship (cf. LeFevre,  1987 ; Montuori & Purser,  1999 ). Closely 
related, Chua ( 2007 ) has argued that the golden ages in many cultures of the 
world occur when their various minorities can be brought into collabora-
tive working relations. In short, this is to say that if means can be found to 
sot en the boundaries among various groups, to explore ai  nities, to appre-
ciate multiplicities, and to prize the process of collaboration, we may move 
in the direction of unprecedented global well- being. 
 In these terms, what is to be said of the three trajectories described 
in this chapter? All of them move toward dissolving the tradition of the 
autonomous, self- contained individual. All move toward a greater appre-
ciation and investment in relationship. In this sense, all three could 
 contribute to the more promising alternative just described. Yet, there are 
signii cant shortcomings represented in both the trajectories of encap-
sulation and play. In the former case, the individual becomes immersed 
within the reality and values of a circumscribed group. Everything outside 
may become either irrelevant or threatening. h e potential for integrating 
multiple perspectives is diminished. In the case of the playing self, one 
sacrii ces autonomous selh ood for participation in the relational world of 
the game. Yet, every game also functions as a bounded world within itself. 
And in the case of games, these are worlds generated by others, typically 
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for commercial purposes. h us, the playing self may move with ease across 
the span of game- worlds. However, there is little invitation here to appreci-
ate or participate in alternative worlds – in their terms. 
 In terms of world futures, it is thus the general and uncontrolled immer-
sion in technologies of communication that may of er the best hope for 
future well- being. Most valued is the individual who moves freely across 
various spaces of relationship, absorbing from all, and emerging as a multi-
potentialed hybrid. h e relational nomad will suf er losses – longing spo-
radically for the valued traditions that he or she is simultaneously rendering 
obsolete. Yet, given the technologies for creating new forms of life, these 
explorers of the new social space may just possibly generate life- giving and 
life- sustaining alternatives . 
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